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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-AVAILABILITY OF FEDERAL COURT INJUNCTION TO 
PREVENT FEDERAL OFFICER FROM TESTIFYING IN STATE COURT AS TO ILLEGAL-
LY-OBTAINED EVIDENCE-Prosecution of petitioner in federal court for the un-
lawful acquisition of marihuana1 failed when the court granted petitioner's 
motion to suppress2 the marihuana as evidence because it was obtained by a 
1 50 Stat. L. 555 (1937), 26 U.S.C. (1952) §2593 (a). 
2 Made pursuant to rule 41 (e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C. 
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search based on an invalid search warrant.3 The federal officer who had 
seized the marihuana then swore to a complaint before a state judge, and 
a warrant for petitioner's arrest for violation of state lmv4 issued. While 
awaiting trial, petitioner filed a motion in federal district court to enjoin 
the federal officer from testifying in the state court. The district court 
denied the injunction, and the court of appeals affirmed.5 On certiorari, 
held, reversed, four justices dissenting.6 To enjoin the federal officer 
from testifying is merely to enforce the federal rules regulating search and 
seizure against those persons owing obedience to them. The policy of the 
rules is to protect the privacy of citizens; that policy is defeated if the 
federal officer can flout them and use the fruits of his unlawful act in 
either federal or state proceedings. Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 76 
S.Ct. 292 (1956). 
Although illegally-obtained evidence is not excluded at common law,7 
federal courts must exclude evidence obtained by federal officers in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment if the person from whom the evidence 
was seized makes a timely8 motion to suppress.9 The rule of exclusion is 
a rule of evidence. It is not a constitutional mandate, but 1s judicially 
derived from the Fourth Amendment to deter10 violations of its guarantees 
by federal officers.11 Only the victim of the unlawful search and seizure 
may invoke the rule,12 and only evidence obtained by federal officers is 
excluded.13 The rule is an exercise by the Supr~me Court of its power over 
(1952). Petitioner did not request return of the marihuana because under 28 U.S.C. 
(1952) §24_63, property so seized is not repleviable but is deemed to be in the custody 
of the law and subject only to the orders of the federal court having jurisdiction over it. 
3 Rule 41, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C. (1952) regulates the conduct 
of searches and seizures. Rule 41 (c) was violated in particular because the warrant was 
insufficient on its face, no probable cause existed, and the affidavit supporting the warrant 
was based on unsworn statements. 
4 N.M. Stat. Ann. (1953) c. 54, §54-5-14. 
5 Rea v. United States, (10th Cir. 1954) 218 F. (2d) 237. 
6 Justice Harlan wrote the dissenting opinion, with Justices Burton, Minton, and Reed 
joining. 
7 See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2183 (1940). 
s See Edwards, "Seasonable Protests Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures," 
37 MINN. L. REv. 188 (1953). 
9 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341 (1914). 
10 The judicial motive for constructing the rule of exclusion is the notorious in-
effectiveness of normal criminal and civil remedies against the offending officer. See Ed-
wards, "Criminal Liability for Unreasonable Searches and Seizures," 41 VA. L .. REv. 621 
(1955); Foote, "Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights," 39 MINN. L. 
REv. 493 (1955). 
11 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 69 S.Ct. 1359 (1949); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 
128, 74 S.Ct. 381 (1954). 
12 Connolly v. Medalie, (2d Cir. 1932) 58 F. (2d) 629; Wilson v. United States, (10th · 
Cir. 1955) 218 F. (2d) 754. See Edwards, "Standing to Suppress Unreasonably Seized 
Evidence,'' 47 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 471 (1952). 
13 Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 47 S.Ct. 248 (1927); Burdeau v. McDowell, 
256 U.S. 465, 41 S.Ct. 574 (1921); Serio v. United States, (5th Cir. 1953) 203 F. (2d) 576. 
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the admission of evidence to achieve a non-evidentiary purpose, i.e., law 
enforcement consistent with constitutional guarantees. In the principal 
case the Court permits the use of a district court injunction as a means of 
achieving this purpose and thus adds a new weapon to deter federal officers 
from violating federal search and seizure regulations. The injunction 
permits the victim to go beyond the federal forum, where he is protected 
by the exclusionary rule, to block state use of evidence illegally obtained 
by federal officers. This new right is important because the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not require the states to apply the exclusionary rule.14 
Although freedom from unreasonable search and seizure is "implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty,"15 exclusion of evidence so obtained is not.16 
Thus, an unreasonable search and seizure by state officers is a deprivation 
of liberty and property without due process of law, but state courts may 
choose to admit or exclude evidence so obtained. The question, then, is 
whether, in order to discipline a federal officer, a federal court should 
enjoin him from testifying in a state court and thereby prevent, or at least 
seriously hamper, the state's prosecution of a defendant. The threat of 
such an injunction will deter federal officers who disregard rules of search 
and seizure to obtain evidence for use by state officers. But the injunc-
tion will be no deterrent to federal officers intent only upon the enforce-
ment of federal law, since state use of such evidence is not the motive for 
the unlawful search and seizure. Moreover, federal officers may thwart 
the injunction by simply turning real evidence over to state authorities 
before the injunction issues.17 However, the injunction will probably 
always be sufficient to prevent a federal officer from testifying in the state 
trial, and if the state is relying solely on his testimony the prosecution will 
fail. 
In general, federal courts will not interfere in state criminal proceed-
ings by enjoining the prosecuting officials18 or the tribunal.19 In accord 
with this policy the Supreme Court has refused to enjoin use in a state 
court of evidence obtained by state officers by an unreasonable search and 
seizure, although the Civil Rights Act20 authorizes equitable relief against 
14 Wolf v. Colorado, note 11 supra. 
15 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 at 325, 58 S.Ct. 149 (1937). 
16 Wolf v. Colorado, note 11 supra. 
17 A federal court may summarily direct the return of illegally-obtained property 
in the possession of an officer of the court. Wise v. Henkel, 220 U.S. 556, 31 S.Ct. 599 
(1911); Weeks v. United States, note 9 supra. But if the illegally-obtained property is 
in the possession of an officer of the government who is not an officer of the court, there 
is no jurisdictional basis for the court to direct a return of the property. An attorney or 
person acting under a court warrant is an officer of the court. In re Behrens, (2d Cir. 
1930) 39 F. (2d) 561; In re Meader, (D.C. N.Y. 1945) 60 F. Supp. 80. 
1s In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 8 S.Ct. 482 (1888); Harkrader v. Wadley, 172 U.S. 148, 
19 S.Ct. 119 (1898); Davis &: Farnum Mfg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 189 U.S. 207, 23 S.Ct. 498 
(1903); Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 47 S.Ct. 681 (1927). 
19 28 u.s.c. (1952) §2283. 
20 Rev. Stat. 1979 (1873-74), 42 U.S.C. (1952) §1983. 
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deprivation of constitutional rights by state officers acting under color of 
law.21 Since the petitioner in the principal case sought to enjoin a federal 
officer, the Court argued that there is no direct interference. However, 
the practical impact will be just as great as if the injunction were directed 
at the state prosecutor, for it is the state that intends to use the illegally-
obtained evidence, not the federal officer. The result is that the state 
may not use evidence which, even if it were used, -would not deny the 
petitioner due process of law or any statutory right. Surely there is a better 
method to deter federal officers than to apply the rationale of the exclu-
sionary rule to the use of the injunctive power so as to place relevant, 
constitutionally admissible evidence beyond the reach of the state court.22 
This is especially so when the necessity and effectiveness of the exclusionary 
rule itself is so widely disputed.23 The injunction, like the exclusionary 
rule,. "directly serves only to protect those upon- whose person or premises 
something incriminating has been found.''24 The slight extent to which 
the principal case will encourage federal officers to adhere to search and 
seizure regulations does not warrant the substantial interference with local 
law enforcement which it entails. 
Edward C. Hanpeter 
21 Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 72 S.Ct. 118 (1951). 
22 More effective tort remedies with substantial minimum recoveries have been sug-
gested. See Foote, "Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights," 39 MINN. L. 
REv. 493 (1955). 
123 See the appendix to Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Wolf v. Colorado, note 11 
supra, at 33. Authorities favoring admissibility: 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §§2183, 
2184 {1940); Harno, "Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure," 19 Iu.. L. REv. 
303 (1925); Waite, "Police Regulation by Rules of Evidence," 42 MICH. L. REv. 679 
(1944}; Waite, "Judges and the Crime Burden," 54 MICH. L. REv. 169 (1955). For ex-
clusion: Atkinson, "Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable Searches 
and Seizures," 25 CoL. L. REv. 11 (1925); Allen, "The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, 
Federalism, and the Civil Liberties," 45 Iu.. L. REv. 1 (1950). 
24 Justice Frankfurter in Wolf v. Colorado, note 11 supra, at 31. 
